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mardi 31 août 2010

Dispensing with Clausewitz

Once employed by the political consultancy group Devine Mulvey, and now pursuing a graduate degree at the Center for Curatorial Studies at Bard College, Gene McHugh says he is interested in "questioning the applicability of [Guy] Debord's own conception of resistance (particularly detournement) in an age of networked, topological communication." Perhaps "Debord's strategies of resistance do not in fact jive with our version of the society of the spectacle."[1]Then why keep bringing him up? Like so many before him, McHugh needs to both cite Debord (an obligation at this point) and put Debord behind him so that he (McHugh) can continue to do what he is doing "in good faith.[2] "McHugh's article on the Radical Software Group's version of Debord's cabinet game Kriegspiel -- which drew a cease and desist letter, alleging copyright infringement, from a lawyer retained by Debord's widow, Alice Becker-Ho, in April 2008 -- attacks Debord's relevance on two fronts.
First, McHugh asserts that "detournement, that famous cornerstone of Situationism [sic] . . . is itself, by now, a familiar concept in Internet culture [. . .] The second major Situationist tactic, derive, or the arbitrary drifting through urban space, has become a primary tool of online capitalism [. . .] At least some of his [Debord's] strategies of countering it [the spectacle] have been effectively incorporated into the internal logic of communications media today."
Commonly repeated though they are, these claims are largely meaningless. First, the Situationist International evolved and progressed over time, so much so that there were three distinct periods in its existence. Detournement and derive were important, even "cornerstone," concepts, yes, but in the SI's first period (1957-1961). And so, while it may be true that the spectacle of today has apparently recuperated detournement and derive, this says nothing about the status of the weapons forged and used during the SI's second period (1962-1966), when theoretical critique replaced artistic experimentation, nor during the SI's third period (1967-1971), when the SI concentrated on strictly political interventions in France and elsewhere. But has the spectacle really recuperated detournement and derive? McHugh refers to certain forms of communication that have been recuperated. But what about their content? It is quite clear that there has been no "incorporation" of Debord's primary themes (alienation, dispossession and decomposition) into the language of the spectacle, even at this late date.
The second move McHugh makes is to claim that Debord's Kriegspiel, rather than recuperated, has been revealed to be unworthy of recuperation. Building upon remarks made by the RSG's Alexander Galloway, who claimed in Cabinet[3] magazine that Kriegspiel had "more in common with Napoleon's 1806 Battle of Jena than Debord's own 1968 Battle of Paris," McHugh tries to call attention to "the blatant anachronism of the Clausewitzian theories underlying [Debord's game] and the accompanying lack of a substantive formal connection to the asymmetrical warfare that Debord himself experienced in May 1968 [. . .] The tactical apparatus of both the 'Game of War' [by the RSG] and Kriegspiel crumbles when viewed through the lens of postmodern military theorization." According to McHugh, Debord (and thus Galloway's version of the game) "neglects to represent how communication has in fact been used by more recent resistance groups such as guerrilla armies, terrorist cells, and hackers unleashing computer viruses." Thus, McHugh concludes, Alice Becker-Ho isn't to be criticized for exerting copyright control over a work by her husband, but for going after an infringement that actually demonstrates the "futility" of her husband's work, not its potency.
It is ludicrous to imagine that Guy Debord was the either the "Napoleon" (the military leader) or the "Clausewitz" (the military historian) of "the Battle of Paris." Debord was simply one person among many at the barricades of the rue Gay Lassac,[4] in the occupied Sorbonne and, later, in the national library occupied by the situs and Enrages. He was never "in command." Furthermore, the May 1968 movement in Paris (and elsewhere in France) was not some kind of military battle, i.e, an instance of "asymmetrical warfare" between cops and protestors. Such a notion both exaggerates the degree of organization that the May movement had reached (unlike the Paris Commune, it did not possess an armed guard) and trivializes the stakes of the contest (the "battlefields" of May 1968 weren't simply a few student-dominated streets in Paris, but the factories, ports and transportation systems of the entire country, as well).
It is even worse to imply on the basis of such flimsy claims that Debord himself -- despite or perhaps precisely because of his very participation in/leadership of the May 1968 movement -- did not realize that it had little or nothing to do with classical military theory (Clausewitz) and that May 1968 was in fact an early postmodern instance of "nonhierarchical dispersion," "networked opposition" and "cutting-edge warfare." Perhaps this is why General Debord lost the Battle of Paris? In McHugh's hypothesis, Debord had been clueless about truly contemporary warfare ever since 1968: in 1977, when he designed Kriegspiel, and again in 1987, when he defended it in a book co-authored with Alice Becker-Ho. It simply took Alex Galloway's failed attempt to bring Debord's Kriegspiel into the age of computers to reveal the game's fatal weaknesses.
But of course Guy Debord did not live and write in the era before the advent of "more recent resistance groups such as guerrilla armies, terrorist cells, and hackers unleashing computer viruses." Guerrilla armies and terrorist cells were active in the 1970s, when Kriegspiel was created, and Debord spent a good deal of time discussing them both in his Preface to the 4th Italian Edition of the Society of the Spectacle (1979) and his Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (1988). And though he knew nothing of hackers or viruses, Debord deliberately constructed his Comments so that it could not be read by computers. Parts of it are "deliberately confused."[5]
More to the point, Debord's interest in Clausewitz was neither superficial nor short-lived. As far as we can tell, it began in the early 1970s, when Gerard Lebovici showed Debord a copy of Clausewitz's book. In a letter dated 21 February 1974, and speaking with respect to the developments then taking place in Portugal, Debord -- always one to move with the times -- proclaimed that, "At this stage and to speak schematically, the basic theoreticians to retrieve and develop are no longer Hegel, Marx and Lautreamont, but Thucydides, Machiavelli and Clausewitz."[6] It was presumably this turn from critique to strategy that led Debord to create his Kriegspiel three years later. Between 1984 and 1989, Debord devoted a great deal of time and energy to helping Editions Gerard Lebovici publish Jean-Pierre Baudet's translation of Clausewitz's Vom Kriege,[7] which had previously appeared in French, but never unabridged or translated well. Debord not only "recommended" the book for publication, he also fact-checked, copyedited and proofread the manuscript himself. He insisted that Baudet's translation be illustrated with maps from the time, and even went to the National Library and managed to locate seven suitable examples.
McHugh and Galloway, by contrast, know nothing about Clausewitz. The former speaks of "Clausewitzian theories," as if Clausewitz were a source of theories, instead of a rare and fine example of dialectical thinking about theory; and the later speaks of the "Clausewitzian mentality" -- the mentality of "resistance" -- as if Clausewitz's theories [sic] were actually a mind-set that always and only sees two alternatives (attack or be defeated). Together, these two "budding anarchists"[8] reject Guy Debord (and Carl von Clausewitz, too) in favor of the well-known military theorist Roland Barthes (!), who wrote "there is only one way left to escape the alienation of present-day society: to retreat ahead of it." But won't such a "retreat" be a series of defeats, ending in a rout? No, it will be a "'hypertrophic' forward escape," says McHugh; it will "push technology into a hypertrophic state, further than it is meant to go."
What successes can this "postmodern military theorization" claim? (I mean, in reality, not in cyberspace or on university curriculum vitae.) Under the name "Revolution in Military Affairs," this theorization called for the single-minded use of "shock and awe," airpower, and small teams of special forces -- and the rejection of such "traditional" (Clausewitzian) theories and practices such as diplomacy, ground troops and the use of overwhelming force -- in America's attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001 and in America's second war against Iraq in March 2003. This same theorization was utilized in Israel's war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006.[9] In each of these cases, "postmodern military theorization" did not lead to spectacular victories, but to humiliating defeats. And yet, here are McHugh and Galloway -- claiming to be speaking in the name of effectiveness in combating the spectacle -- blithely continuing to advocate this "theorization" of warfare as if it were more relevant than Debord and his "merely nostalgic" Kriegspiel![10] The similarity of these postmodernists to Bush, Cheney and Rumsfield is striking: all have little or no actual knowledge of warfare, and all see "war" as an end in itself, as a "network," as something fundamentally open-ended and impossible to terminate, and not as a means to a political end.
[1] "Battle Code: Guy Debord's Game of War and the Radical Software Group," Artforum International (November 2008), pp. 167-168. Earlier in the year, Book Forum (an off-shoot of Artforum) published an article that contains at least 50 incorrect, slanderous or otherwise objectionable statements about Guy Debord and Kriegspiel.
[2] Note the following passage, which appears in our essay The Society of the Virtual Spectacle:
Following a pattern established in the 1970s by Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard, Giroux only mentions Guy Debord and his "pioneering" theory of the society of the spectacle so as to say that, since the 1960s, the spectacle has changed so much that Debord's theory is no longer relevant. Debord and "older notions of the spectacle" could not possibly account for "the emergence of new media and image-based media technologies" such as "camcorders, cellular camera-phones, satellite television, digital recorders and the Internet" because none of it existed in 1967. Either these gadgets are so fundamentally different from radio, TV and the cinema, or the "new media" exist in such great quantities, that "a structural transformation of everyday life" has taken place: these media "have revolutionized the relationship between the specificity of an event and its public display." And while "neither the concept of the spectacle nor the practice of terrorism itself is new," there has been a new and completely unprecedented "merging of the spectacle, terrorism, war and politics." There is, in sum, "a new regime of the spectacle in which screen culture and visual politics create spectacular events just as much as they record them."
Lest we suspect that this "new" spectacle seems an awful lot like the "old" spectacle, and that is it not true that "critical discourses of the spectacle need to be revised so as to provide the theoretical tools required to fully understand how the spectacle has changed," Giroux contrasts "the terrorism of the spectacle" (the old, surpassed reality) with "the spectacle of terrorism" (the new one). While the former was based in "fascist culture and late capitalism's culture of commodification," the later is rooted in "a new notion of the subject forged in social relations largely constructed around fear and terror." And, while the former was dominated by "consensus," "a sense of unity," "solidarity," "illusion" and "depoliticization" (as if the Cold War never existed!), the later is dominated by "a theatrics of fear and shock," "politicization," and "the image added with the thrill of the real." The key idea is that "the spectacle of terrorism undercuts the primacy of consumerism, challenges state power and uses the image to construct a new type of politics organized around the modalities of death, hysteria, panic and violence" (emphasis added).
To dismiss Debord in this way requires two operations, neither of which is intellectually honest. First, Giroux must primarily rely upon summaries of Debord's The Society of the Spectacle produced by other academics, and not on a direct confrontation with the text itself. Not surprisingly, such summaries are completely inadequate and have an agenda that Giroux shares: "The image had replaced the commodity as the basic unit of capitalism; rather than arguing that commodities remained the sine qua non of domination, he insisted, as Eugene L. Arva points out, that in the current era, 'the system of mediation by representation (the world of the spectacle, if you wish) has come to bear more relevance than commodities themselves.'" Second, Giroux must pretend that Debord never wrote another word about the spectacle after 1967: "Debord could not have imagined either how the second media revolution would play out, with its multiple producers, distributors and consumers; or how a post-9/11 war on terrorism would shift, especially in the United States, from an emphasis on consumerism to an equally absorbing obsession with war and its politically regressive corollaries of fear, anxiety and insecurity." And so, for Giroux, neither the Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (and its remarks on computerized networks), nor the preface to the fourth Italian edition of The Society of the Spectacle (and its remarks on the spectacle of terrorism in Italy during the 1970s), ever existed.
With Guy Debord and his inconvenient insistence on the commodity out of the way, Giroux can get to where he wants to go (where he has always been?), which is a completely uncritical embrace of the "new" media and Leftist politics: "Radically new modes of communication and resistance based upon the new media are on full display [sic] in the global justice movements, in the emergence of bloggers holding corporate and government powers more accountable, and in the new kinds of cultural and political struggles waged by the Zapatistas, the Seattle protesters, and various new social movements held together through the informational networks provided by the Internet and the Web." Unlike Debord, obsessed as he was with social revolution, "theorists such as Thomas Keenan, Mark Poster, Douglas Kellner and Jacques Derrida are right in suggesting that new electronic technologies and media publics 'remove restrictions on the horizon of possible communications' and, in doing so, suggest new possibilities for engaging the media as a democratic force both for critique and for positive intervention and change."
[3] I would like to quote from this article, but it is not available anywhere on-line.                                                    
[4] See Debord's letter to Michel Prigent dated 29 August 1981.
[5] See letter to Pierre Besson dated 31 October 1989.
[6] Letter to Eduardo Rothe dated 21 February 1974.
[7] See letters to Floriana Lebovici dated 20 November 1984, January 1988 and 19 March 1988.
[8] "If Debord's strategies of resistance do not in fact jive with our version of the society of the spectacle, what is a budding anarchist to do?" McHugh asks with respect to Alex Galloway.
[9] See our review of Eyal Weizman's Hollow Land.
[10] Note added 21 December 2008: note well the following article, published on 19 December 2008 by Haaretz under the title "U.S. report: Hezbollah fought Israel better than any Arab army."
A new report from the U.S. Army War College warns that the American military must learn the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, in which Hezbollah operated more like a conventional army than a guerrilla organization.
The report, "The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy," warns against placing too heavy an emphasis on classic guerrilla warfare, and raises the possibility of further non-state actors following the Lebanese militant group's example.
"Hezbollah's 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has been receiving increasing attention as a prominent recent example of a non-state actor fighting a Westernized state," the authors of the report state. "In particular, critics of irregular-warfare transformation often cite the 2006 case as evidence that non-state actors can nevertheless wage conventional warfare in state-like ways."
The authors of the report, Dr. Stephen D. Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, state that changes made by the U.S. Army in conducting urban warfare against guerrilla fighters in Iraq could compromise the military's ability to deal with other enemies in the future.
The authors give a high grade to Hezbollah's performance in the 2006 war, describing it as more effective than that of any Arab army that confronted Israel in the Jewish state's history, and that Hezbollah militants wounded more Israelis per fighter than any previous Arab effort.
Unlike a traditional guerrilla force, however, Hezbollah emphasized holding territory and digging in to bunkers, instead of the usual tactic of hiding among civilian populations. Likewise, the militant organization's discipline and coordination highly resembled those of conventional armies.
This combination of conventional and guerrilla tactics, the report claims, places new challenges before the U.S. Army. It calls for preparing the military for asymmetrical urban warfare, while at the same time working closely with civilian populations. It also calls for reducing military activity likely to harm the image of the U.S.
The report indicates that no army can be ideally prepared to deal with both kinds of enemy, conventional and guerrilla, simultaneously, and that in light of the discrepancies between the lessons of the Second Lebanon War and the current U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, serious challenges confront military planners.
While fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan demands the ability to defeat guerrilla forces, the example of Lebanon may inspire enemies of the U.S. to adopt more conventional methods.

NEGATIVITE BRISEE

Remarques sur la critique de l’Aufklärung
chez Adorno et Horkheimer
                                                                                                       
L’Aufklärung n’a jamais été critiquée plus radicalement que dans la Dialectique de la raison – ni avant ni après la parution de cet ouvrage. C’est ce qui fait l’actualité permanente ainsi que la fascination (oscillant entre identification enthousiaste et refus farouche) que le livre exerce jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Manifestement, la Dialectique de la raison marque une limite de la critique devant laquelle la conscience bourgeoise recule, car elle devrait alors se mettre en question fondamentalement. Les deux auteurs eux-mêmes ont toujours éprouvé une certaine appréhension devant les conséquences de leur pensée. Horkheimer finit même par retourner dans le giron de l’Aufklärung et de la démocratie occidentale. Et si Adorno n’a jamais révoqué sa critique, on trouve chez lui aussi, dans ses œuvres tardives, d’évidentes traces de freinage. Au fond, la Dialectique de la raison constitue le témoignage d’une critique qui, prenant peur d’elle-même, se rétracte toujours partiellement. Tout au moins en partie, son mouvement argumentatif n’est pas inhérent à la dialectique de la chose mais va jusqu’à résister à celle-ci. Je vais ici essayer de le montrer et d’en dévoiler les causes – en tant que condition préalable pour que la critique de l’Aufklärung soit pensée jusque dans ses conséquences ultimes.
1
La critique de l’Aufklärung faite par Horkheimer et Adorno vise essentiellement le formalisme de la raison tel qu’on le trouve exprimé le plus purement chez Kant, c’est-à-dire l’indifférence de la raison à l’égard de tout contenu particulier et la subordination de la matière sous la forme que la raison suppose. Dans ce formalisme réside l’origine de l’hybris du sujet à l’égard de l’objet, hybris qui constitue tout à la fois la prison du sujet : aussi longtemps que l’objet qui est affirmé essentiellement comme identique à la nature extérieure et (surtout) intérieure n’apparaît que comme quelque chose qui doit être soumis, le sujet ne pourra se libérer, lui, de la contrainte aveugle de la seconde nature : la domination. La raison formaliste se révèle donc comme principe de domination, le contraire de l’émancipation. Et c’est précisément en cela qu’elle se révèle étroitement liée à son prétendu adversaire, la « contre-Aufklärung » ou l’irrationalisme. Ceux-ci ne sont nullement « ce qui est radicalement différent » et encore moins quelque résidu de la pensée d’avant l’Aufklärung ; ils représentent le côté obscur de la raison et lui sont inséparablement liés.
Suite PDF
Cet article a paru en décembre 2002 dans la revue allemande Krisis « Contributions à une critique de la société marchande ». Texte traduit de l’allemand par Wolfgang Kukulies et Luc Mercier.
 

dimanche 29 août 2010

A critique of neo-anarchism

A strategic analysis of the problem

Anarchism -- real anarchism, revolutionary anarchism -- was destroyed by the "Communists" (first the Leninists, then the Stalinists) in the 1920s and 1930s: from the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion in 1921 to the defeat of the Spanish Revolution in 1937, anarchists were "shot by both sides." Whatever remnants of anarchism that still subsisted after the 1930s were unable to deal with the theoretical and practical problems posed by modern fascism, the bureaucratization of the world and later (in the 1940s and early 1950s) the birth of prosperous, consumption-based capitalism. By 1955, revolutionary anarchism was completely dead. One might argue that it has remained dead since then, but it might be more charitable to say that it was partially revived by the various post-Marxist revolutionary movements of the 1950s/1960s (Socialisme ou Barbarie, the Situationist International, the Japanese Zengakuren and a few others).
For all too many contemporary anarchists (one might more accurately call them neo-anarchists), "anarchism" suddenly reappeared -- after an absence of almost 60 years! -- in Chiapas in 1994 and/or Seattle in 1999. But real anarchism had been dead for so long that no one would recognize it if they saw it, and neither of these two events were really anarchist, that is to say, neither of them were true proletarian movements. The former was a kind of watered-down Maoism, while the second was a concentrated or "ultra" Leftism. Nevertheless, because these events were significant and (more importantly) could be portrayed as "revolutionary" by the bourgeois press, the last 13 years have seen "anarchism" sprout everywhere. So many books are written about it, so many talks and speeches and conferences are given about it -- one might think that the State is actually tottering and about to fall! But of course, the State isn't tottering (at least not for these reasons) and anarchism, rather than being everywhere, is actually nowhere. What remains is watered-down Maoism and concentrated Leftism. Have doubts? Just look at A.N.S.W.E.R., the International Action Center, and all the other "Communist" front groups, which completely dominate this country's pathetic anti-war movement, as well as many of the pro-immigration and anti-police brutality groups, the release-Mumia groups, et al.
Note well that many neo-anarchists are completely fixated on the anarchists and anarchist movements of the early twentieth century -- endless and empty recollections of Sacco and Vanzetti, the glory days of the Spanish Civil War, etc etc -- and know absolutely nothing about any of the revolutionary events of the mid- and late-Twentieth Century. Note well the complete stupefaction when someone mentions the events that took place in East Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), Belgium (1962), Paris (1968), Lisbon (1974), Bologna (1977), Gdansk (1980) etc. All the neo-anarchists know about is Spain and Seattle, Seattle and Spain. (Sometimes they also know about Argentina and Venezuuela, but their interest is either Zapatista chic or barely disguised admiration for Leninism.)
Over the course of the intervening period, the Left was never truly de-Stalinized (much like the old East Germany); it never really dealt with its roots in and continuing attachment to Social Democracy and "Communism." And so the neo-anarchists of today are actually Leftists who have simply learned that it is "not cool" to be Marxists and so describe themselves as "anti-authoritarians" instead. But the leopard dies with its spots and the neo-anarchists' underlying Leftism shines through in their unshakeable preoccupation with commodities, corporations and globalization, and their marginalization of the State and its much more significant crimes: concentration camps, secret prison-systems, extraordinary renditions and the systematic use of torture, et al. (Unlike the revolutionary anarchists of Spain, the neo-anarchists and other Leftists of today are also completely blind to the role that religion plays in the State's domination of this planet.)
If neo-anarchists are against the war in Iraq, they shout "No blood for oil!" as if oil -- the commodity, the oil companies, etc -- account for all of Bush/Cheney's motivations for going to war. The idea that the war was fought to strengthen the American presidency to the point of totalitarianism completely escapes them. Note as well the neo-anarchists' complete lack of interest in finding out the truth about all the various events that are cynically lumped together under the rubric of "September 11th." Like all Leftists, they are content to dismiss the 911 Truth Movement as "conspiracy theorists" and "wingnuts." Why? It speaks directly of the State and its secret/security services, which are beyond the narrow focus of commodity-obsessed "former"-Marxists.                                              
This is why we are so relentlessly hostile to people who are stupid enough to lump "Situationism" (and its slogans) in with Leftism and/or with the art world, whether it is with institutional art or street art. The Situationist International was one of the very few groups in the world that was anti-capitalist and anti-"Communist." Despite what the contributors, editors and/or publishers involved in, say, Realizing the Impossible: Art against Authority (AK Press 2007), the situationist movement was not an "art movement." The situationists were -- especially after 1962, and even more so during and after 1968 -- a revolutionary organization that hated "artists" and Leftists as much as they hated capitalists and Stalinists.


Some practical observations

As we pushed and defended our right to critique the pseudo-Situationists, neo-anarchists and Leftists who either contributed to the Realizing the Impossible book, published it or agreed to be part of a panel that would discuss it -- we confined our comments to a single "thread" on the website of the New York City "Independent Media Center" -- something striking happened. Though all of the comments claimed 1) that the Situationist International was a marginal group, no longer worthy of attention, 2) that the events that are remembered and praised by situationists are also marginal and not worth any attention, and 3) that we personally are marginal and not worthy of any attention, these people did not ignore this thread and move on to something else, as one would fully expect from the dismissive attitudes (and ridiculously ignorant opinions) that they expressed. Quite the contrary, they kept returning to it and posting what they claimed were "comments."
It is very significant that literally none of these "comments" -- and there were several dozen of them in total -- responded to or even acknowledged the existence of our "strategic critique" of neo-anarchism. Instead, there was a stream of increasingly virulent personal attacks on us. As if to prove Guy Debord right when he wrote the following in 1978 --
Passions that are forced to remain faraway are generally malevolent. The contemporary spectator appears to perpetually watch for the fleeting occasion to make his opinion known on a great variety of things he knows nothing about, but in every case he only expresses his dominant emotions: omniform envy, ambition without means and pretension without illusion. Because these are the traits that massively express a system of production that cannot dream of making consumers more successfully than it makes merchandise. This desperate mediocrity regularly hastens to say anything at all with authority, so as to resemble the authorities, who also say anything at all. This mediocrity systematically forgets the obvious, dogmatizes from the rumors that it has itself invented and blindly talks nonsense about its own falsifications.
-- the maliciousness, bad faith and self-righteousness of these anonymous comments (which broke all the rules established by the "IMC," if not the laws against libel, as well) were far beyond any scorn we might have shown for the ignorant neo-anarchists and Leftists to whom we objected in general, not as individual people (we certainly did not mention any individual's name). Such is the "mindset" of the neo-anarchists and Leftists: push them too hard on the intellectual or theoretical levels, and they become truly vicious on the personal level. Their resemblance to Communists is striking.
It is the way that they throw mud that is truly significant: though they claim to be courageous and "moral" -- and they are certainly very moralizing -- they will not identify themselves, they will not speak in their own names, they will act like a gang of thugs. They believe they have "safety in numbers" and act as if their numbers are safe. We are convinced that any specific individual who dares to speak out against them will be attacked in this same fashion, though the content and tone of the calumnies might be different from, perhaps less gruesome than, the ones that have been hurled against us: "you are not constructive, you are negative, you undermine our solidarity, you give comfort to our enemies," etc. etc. Raoul Vaneigem was right: it is the individual as such that is shameful to the neo-anarchists, Leftists and other "collectivists," even those who speak of "the rights of individuals"; and when an individual "attacks" them, they try to shame that individual any way they can, so that the individual in question will feel humiliated and "go away." And so attack them, we say, but do not underestimate their intellectual dishonesty or their taste for blood.                                    

samedi 28 août 2010

THE VIOLENCE IN SEATTLE

OK: we've heard what you, the professionals (the professional newspaper writers, television commentators, politicians and leftist activists) think about the violence in Seattle this past week.
Apparently a diverse group -- indeed, the leftist activists among your ranks would have it believed that they are not part of and are actually opposed to the politics of the mainstream writers, commentators and politicians -- you have nevertheless reached consensus, which you are now repeating on every occasion and on all channels, as if there could be no disagreement: the violence in Seattle was perpetrated by protesters against property; the violence was regrettable, counter-productive, stupid and ineffective; the violence was caused by a small "isolated" group of protesters, upon whom you have poured insults, calumnies and contempt; the protesters who self-righteously denounced and tried to detain "the violent anarchists" were courageous and brave, even heroes; and the police should have reserved their armoured personnel carriers, three-foot-long solid-oak clubs, pepper spray, tear gas, and rubber bullets for the violent protesters, and let the non-violent protesters alone.
OK: we've heard what you've said; now shut the fuck up, if only for a second, and let other voices be heard.
We, like the rioters in Seattle, are sick and tired of your monopolization of communication when it comes to the pressing issues of the day. Despite what you tell us, we know that you do not speak for us and your opinions do not represent what we think. This is especially true for the professional leftist activists who actually defended Starbucks and Niketown against attack, and now feel no shame in proudly reporting this ignominious fact to whomever will listen. These activists, some of whom have in the past actually pretended to protest against Starbucks and Nike, have nevertheless, at the most basic level, always defended them. But now these phony revolutionaries have visibly become what they essentially always were. The hypocrisy of the professional newspaper writers, television commentators, and politicians -- as well as their eager collaboration with the police and special services -- are well known; we intend to make the hypocrisy and collaboration of the "anti-violence" leftists infamous.
But, first and foremost, we must declare our unconditional support for the anarchists, who came to Seattle armed with a well-thought out form of protest that is different from and intended as an explicit alternative to those forms of protest practiced by the conventional leftist groups (rallies, marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, die-ins, street theater and "festival"). The anarchists -- an organic community able to take organized, collective and militant action against their real enemies -- formed themselves into "black blocks" (so named for the black clothes and masks the anarchists wore) and systematically attacked unoccupied corporate chain stores such as McDonalds, the Gap, Nike, Nordstrom, Levi, and Disney, as well as the notoriously corrupt Bank of America. That is to say, the anarchists -- unsatisfied with protesting indirectly against an abstraction -- directly attacked the physical manifestations in real space of "the global economy" to which the World Trade Organization is committed to furthering, not people or "mom and pop" stores.
Adherents to non-violent protest methods have always preached in the most self-righteous of tones against the strategy of targeting corporate property. We feel that their "morality" is actually an uncritical acceptance of the essence of corporate ideology, which elevates fictional corporate entities to the status of human beings, violently imposes an identity between these two categories of "persons," and thus demands "equal protection" under the law for both. Because corporations (only) serve the interests of certain individuals, the inevitable result of this "equal protection for all" is actually double-protection for corporate "persons" and no protection for real ones. The destruction of corporate property is the positive affirmation of autonomous human society and its right to be in control of its institutions, rather than be controlled by them.
But, this time, in Seattle, the "moral" non-violent protesters did more than preach to the unconverted: they actually acted like cops until the real cops came and took over. Using their numerical advantage, the non-violent protesters surrounded, denounced, un-masked, beat up and actually turned over to the police the practitioners of violent protest. In doing so, the "moral majority" among the anti-WTO protesters not only helped the police and the National Guard do their dirty work, but they also assisted in the larger and more long-term effort to criminalize radical political philosophies that is taking place all over this country and through-out the rest of the world. Ironically, the "moral majority" was compensated for its counter-revolutionary efforts with indiscriminate and unprovoked beatings, gassings, shootings and arrests.
It is both appalling and quite telling that none of the professionals who have denounced the controlled violence of the anarchists -- neither the mainstream commentators and politicians nor the leftist activists -- have denounced the unrestrained violence against people (not property) committed in Seattle by the police forces and the National Guard. According to several eyewitness reports, the police tear-gassed "shoppers and people getting dinner, as well as protesters," and that they did so both in downtown Seattle and in the neighborhoods outside the city limits "where the regular people live." In the words of eye-witness Jim Desyllas,
If you were alive, the police gassed you. People got gassed for coming out of restaurants and bars and coffee shops. People coming back from work, kids, women, everyone. People would go out of their houses to see what was happening because these tear gas guns sound like a cannon -- and they would get gassed. A block away there was a Texaco gas station -- [the riot police] threw tear gas at gas pumps, believe it or not -- they were like vandals. They gassed a bus. I saw it with my own eyes. A bus. The driver, the riders, the people just abandoned it.
According to Desyllas, a reporter from Portland, Oregon, "this was not, as Pres. Clinton claims, a peaceful protest marred by the actions of violent protesters. This was a massive, strong but peaceful demonstration which was attacked repeatedly by the police with the express purpose of provoking a violent response to provide photo opportunities for the Western media" and thus "discredit the movement against the WTO because they couldn't dilute it." Desyllas believes that, "This whole thing, this police attack, this was US foreign policy, not some action decided by some bureaucrat in Seattle. This was the State Department." Eye-witness Damon Krane agrees: "By repeatedly attacking and torturing non-violent protesters, the Seattle police sought to incite a riot and finally succeeded to a small degree."
Thus, the anarchists did not precipitate the vicious crack-down, as all the professionals are alleging; rather, the anarchists knew it was coming and acted accordingly. That is to say, they refused in advance to let the outcome of the inevitable struggle for the streets of Seattle be yet another one-sided victory for the forces of order. Though you wouldn't know it from the reports of the professionals, the crack-down had the effect of radicalizing a great many people, that is, bringing people around the anarchist position, not putting them off from it. Jim Desyllas reports that , "because they were gassing everybody, the local people got mad too and they joined the 100 who had been herded out of the city. So soon there were 500 including the neighborhood people and all very angry. Then people set up barricades."
For as long as they lasted, those barricades kept out both vicious police squads and "morally superior" leftists. For as long as we last, let us not forget the clear division that the barricades made between those who are truly opposed to this society and those who are not.                            
[2-5 December 1999]

vendredi 27 août 2010

Thèses sur la révolution culturelle


1

Le but traditionnel de l’esthétique est de faire sentir, dans la privation et l’absence, certains éléments passés de la vie qui, par une médiation artistique, échapperaient à la confusion des apparences, l’apparence étant alors ce qui subit le règne du temps. Le degré de la réussite esthétique se mesure donc à une beauté inséparable de la durée, et tendant même à une prétention d’éternité. Le but des situationnistes est la participation immédiate à une abondance passionnelle de la vie, à travers le changement de moments périssables délibérément aménagés. La réussite de ces moments ne peut être que leur effet passager. Les situationnistes envisagent l’activité culturelle, du point de vue de la totalité, comme méthode de construction expérimentale de la vie quotidienne, développable en permanence avec l’extension des loisirs et la disparition de la division du travail (à commencer par la division du travail artistique).

2

L’art peut cesser d’être un rapport sur les sensations pour devenir une organisation directe de sensations supérieures. Il s’agit de produire nous-mêmes, et non des choses qui nous asservissent.

3

Mascolo a raison de dire ("Le Communisme ") que la réduction de la journée de travail par le régime de la dictature du prolétariat est " la plus certaine assurance qu’il puisse donner de son authenticité révolutionnaire ". En effet, " Si l’homme est une marchandise, s’il est traité comme une chose, Si les rapports généraux des hommes entre eux sont des rapports de chose à chose, c’est qu’il est possible de lui acheter son temps ". Mascolo cependant conclue trop vite que " le temps d’un homme librement employé " est toujours bien employé, et que " l’achat du temps est le seul mal ". Il n’y a pas de liberté dans l’emploi du temps sans la possession des instruments modernes de construction de la vie quotidienne. L’usage de tels instruments marquera le saut d’un art révolutionnaire utopique à un art révolutionnaire expérimental.

4

Une association internationale de situationnistes peut être considérée comme une union des travailleurs d’un secteur avancé de la culture, ou plus exactement comme une union de tous ceux qui revendiquent le droit à un travail que les conditions sociales entravent maintenant ; donc comme une tentative d’organisation de révolutionnaires professionnels dans la culture.

5

Nous sommes séparés pratiquement de la domination réelle des pouvoirs matériels accumulés par notre temps. La révolution communiste n’est pas faite et nous sommes encore dans le cadre de la décomposition des vieilles superstructures culturelles. Henri Lefebvre voit justement que cette contradiction est au centre d’un désaccord spécifiquement moderne entre l’individu progressiste et le monde, et appelle romantique-révolutionnaire la tendance culturelle qui se fonde sur ce désaccord. L’insuffisance de la conception de Lefebvre est de faire de la simple expression du désaccord le critère suffisant d’une action révolutionnaire dans la culture. Lefebvre renonce par avance à toute expérience de modification culturelle profonde en se satisfaisant d’un contenu : la conscience du possible-impossible (encore trop lointain), qui peut être exprimée sous n’importe quelle forme prise dans le cadre de la décomposition.

6

Ceux qui veulent dépasser, dans tous ses aspects, l’ancien ordre établi ne peuvent s’attacher au désordre du présent, même dans la sphère de la culture. Il faut lutter sans plus attendre, aussi dans la culture, pour l’apparition concrète de l’ordre mouvant de l’avenir. C’est sa possibilité, déjà présente parmi nous, qui dévalorise toutes les expressions dans les formes culturelles connues. Il faut mener à leur destruction extrême toutes les formes de pseudo-communication, pour parvenir un jour à une communication réelle directe (dans notre hypothèse d’emploi de moyens culturels supérieurs : la situation construite). La victoire sera pour ceux qui auront su faire le désordre sans l’aimer.

7

Dans le monde de la décomposition nous pouvons faire l’essai mais non l’emploi de nos forces. La tâche pratique de surmonter notre désaccord avec le monde, c’est-à-dire de surmonter la décomposition par quelques constructions supérieures, n’est pas romantique. Nous serons des " romantiques révolutionnaires ", au sens de Lefebvre, exactement dans la mesure de notre échec.                                                                                                      Guy Debord


                                                                       



Publié dans Internationale Situationniste n° 1, juin 1958.

lundi 23 août 2010

ROBOTIK UND ARBEIT

Die Alpträume des verdinglichten Bewusstseins

              

Von der Wortwurzel her haben Roboter und Arbeiter dieselbe Bedeutung. Ursprünglich war „Arbeit“ eine Bezeichnung für die Tätigkeit von Unselbständigen (Sklaven) oder „sprechenden Werkzeugen“ (Aristoteles) und daher identisch mit Leiden. Vorbereitet von der christlichen Leidensmetaphysik mit ihrem (strukturell männlichen) „Kultus des abstrakten Menschen“ (Marx), wurde diese negative Bestimmung vom Protestantismus ins Gegenteil verkehrt, glorifiziert und gleichzeitig aus der religiösen Mutation ins weltliche Leben zurückübersetzt. Die neue kapitalistische Produktionsweise verhalf der „Arbeit“ zu einer großen Karriere. Positiv und universell gültig konnte sie nur werden als Produktion eines verselbständigten „abstrakten Reichtums“ (Marx). Es handelte sich jetzt nicht mehr um die allgemeine Bestimmung dessen, was „der Sklave tut“, sondern um die allen Produktionsinhalten gegenüber gleichgültige Verbrennung von menschlicher Energie schlechthin: „Abstrakte Arbeit“ (Marx), verdinglicht zur „Substanz“ des Geldes. Aber nicht für den Genuss, sondern in der Form des Kapitals rückgekoppelt auf sich selbst als endloser Imperativ, aus einem Taler, Euro, Dollar usw. zwei zu machen. Die „freien“ Individuen verwandelten sich in „sprechende Werkzeuge“ oder „Robotniks“ für diesen gesellschaftlichen Selbstzweck, indem die „Arbeitskraft“ zur Ware und erst dadurch der Markt zum totalitären Verhältnis wurde.
Aber die Reduktion der Individuen auf Verbrennungsmaschinen abstrakt-menschlicher Energie bildet nicht die einzige energetische Basis des Kapitalismus. Nicht umsonst wurde „Arbeit“ im 18. Jahrhundert auch zu einem Begriff der Physik als energetisches Vektorverhältnis der entlang eines Wegs auf einen Körper einwirkenden mechanischen Kraft. Den gesellschaftlichen Hintergrund bildet die kapitalistische Anwendung der Naturwissenschaft. Die Maschine des Marktes erzwingt die Konkurrenz der Einzelkapitale um einen Anteil an der gesellschaftlichen Substanzmasse des Geldes; und darin können sie nur bestehen durch Steigerung ihrer Produktivkraft, bedingt durch den Einsatz von Maschinerie und Steuerungsaggregaten. Diese toten physikalischen „Roboter“ aber bedürfen auf wachsender Stufenleiter des Antriebs durch die nicht-menschliche Energie fossiler Brennstoffe. Damit wird der Kapitalismus zu einer Verbrennungskultur im doppelten Sinne; es entfaltet sich eine Dialektik im Verhältnis des Einsatzes von menschlicher und fossiler Energie.
Hegel wusste schon in den Jenaer Frühschriften, dass die von natürlichen Brennstoffen betriebene Robot-Maschinerie sukzessive menschliche Arbeitskraft überflüssig macht, ohne diesem Problem genauer nachzugehen. Marx zeigte, dass im Prozess der Produktivkraftentwicklung der relative Anteil des maschinellen Sachkapitals gegenüber der Arbeitskraft permanent ansteigt: Je höher die Produktivität, desto weniger Verausgabung menschlicher Energie pro Geldkapital und desto größer die Verausgabung fossiler Brennstoffe. Für eine Menschheit, die sich selbst zur Arbeitskraft verdinglicht hat, musste diese fortschreitende Entwicklung als bedrohlich erscheinen. In einem Theaterstück von Carel Capek war 1922 erstmals von einem „Aufstand der Roboter“ die Rede; ein Topos, der seither aus der Science Fiction nicht mehr wegzudenken ist und mit der Kybernetik bzw. Mikroelektronik immer neue Blüten treibt. Noch der raffinierteste Rechner besitzt nicht mehr Leben und autonome Intelligenz als ein Faustkeil. Aber das kapitalistische Fetisch-Bewusstsein erlebt seine eigenen Werkzeuge als fremde, beseelte Macht.
Tatsächlich treibt der Kapitalismus heute auf die „innere Schranke“ (Marx) und den energetischen Kollaps seiner doppelten, gegenläufigen Verbrennungskultur zu. Die hypertrophe, von der Konkurrenz erzwungene tote Maschinerie kann keine Substanz des „abstrakten Reichtums“ darstellen, weil diese allein auf der verdinglichten menschlichen Energie beruht. Indem es eine letztlich technologische Massenarbeitslosigkeit, Unterbeschäftigung und Prekarisierung erzeugt, höhlt das Kapital seine eigene Substanz aus, was auf der anderen Seite als Finanzkrise und Entwertung des Geldes erscheint. Gleichzeitig erschöpft die losgelassene Selbstzweck-Bewegung mit wachsender Geschwindigkeit die Reserven fossiler Energie und beschwört eine Umwelt- bzw. Klimakatastrophe herauf. Auch die stoffliche Gestalt des Maschinensystems ist blind gegenüber allen sozialen und natürlichen Inhalten.
Das kapitalistische Bewusstsein fetischisiert die tote Robotik; heute in Gestalt von Mobiltelefon und Internet bis in die persönliche Befindlichkeit hinein. Einerseits sieht ein „ökologischer Reduktionismus“ keinen anderen Ausweg, als das technologische Aggregat insgesamt niederzureißen und zu einer „natürlichen“, „arbeitsintensiven“ Subsistenzwirtschaft zurückzukehren. Andererseits möchte ein „technologischer Reduktionismus“ die Krise umgekehrt dadurch bewältigen, dass die Software-Produktion zum „Modell“ einer alternativen Vollautomatisierung von allem und jedem wird, in der die ökonomischen Zwänge sich technologisch auflösen und wie im Touristenparadies der Zahlungsfähigen („all inclusive“) Milch und Honig fließen. Die beiden Momente und Konsequenzen der Verbrennungskultur werden jeweils einseitig gegeneinander ausgespielt.
Wenn aber die mikroelektronische Produktivkraft an die Grenzen des Kapitalismus führt, kann die industrielle Produktion weder pauschal verworfen noch linear zur autonomen „technischen Befreiung“ gesteigert werden. Beide Optionen blenden trotz teilweise gegenteiliger Beteuerungen, die aber vage und inkonsequent bleiben, das Grundprinzip der „abstrakten Arbeit“ und des verselbständigten „abstrakten Reichtums“ aus. Es geht darum, diese herrschende Form der universellen Vergesellschaftung zu überwinden, statt sie auf vermeintlich überschaubare ökologische oder technologische „Modelle“ zurückdrehen zu wollen. Erst jenseits von „abstrakter Arbeit“ und Geld (bzw. ihren utopischen Surrogaten) kann eine gesamtgesellschaftliche „Vereinigung freier Individuen“ über den Einsatz der gemeinsamen Ressourcen inhaltsbestimmt entscheiden.

erschienen in der Jungle World am 29.07.2010

Robert Kurz


                                                                   

vendredi 20 août 2010

REMARQUES À PROPOS DES RÉCENTES DÉCLARATIONS D' UN PENSEUR DE LA RADICALITÉ

 Anglais/English
L’adhésion de René Riesel à l’Encyclopédie des Nuisances apporte à celle-ci un soutien inespéré. Devenue ces dernières années l’éditeur d’un certain nombre de livres remâchant inlassablement les mêmes généralités sur la falsification marchande du monde et sur le degré alarmant d’ores et déjà atteint par cette prolifération, l’EdN s’était ainsi contentée de surfer sur la vague grandissante d’opposition aux nuisances et d’y ajouter une tonalité plus “ radicale ”, par le simple fait d’en refuser les habituels compromis réformistes (dialogue avec les institutions ; avec les experts ; avec des partis, syndicats et ONG globalement infréquentables). Or, la montée soudaine, dans les médias, de la vedette Bové et de sa Confédération paysanne accorde à cette dernière une aura publique qu’il est aisé d’exploiter, surtout si cette exploitation se présente, de surcroît, comme liée à un point de vue critique par rapport à la Confédération (celui de Riesel), et si, suprême félicité, ce Riesel rejoint l’Encyclopédie des Nuisances. Voici donc, avec Riesel, une nouvelle caution qui vient à point nommé remplacer celle de Guy Debord, perdue en 1987 dans des circonstances peu reluisantes (sur lesquelles un silence de plomb est scrupuleusement entretenu, véritable omertà d’un tel milieu) ; et cette nouvelle caution, de plus, autorise plus facilement un certain activisme. Ces quelques remarques préliminaires étant faites, et simplement destinées à situer les dessous stratégiques des déclarations publiques d’un René Riesel devenu “ Encyclopédiste ”, l’essentiel demeure évidemment le contenu même des dites déclarations.                                                               
Plusieurs thèmes sont abordés par Riesel :                                                         
1.    le rôle historique de l’IS,
2.    celui du monde rural,
3.    celui de la rationalité scientifique et technocratique.
1.    Le rôle historique de l’IS
Les propos tenus par Riesel à cet égard se montrent passablement ambigus. Debord avait sans doute écrit “ qu’il n’y avait plus d’opposition ” au moment où il écrivait, mais il avait ajouté que “ si l’histoire doit nous revenir après cette éclipse, ce qui dépend de facteurs encore en lutte et donc d’un aboutissement que nul ne saurait exclure avec certitude, ces Commentaires pourront servir à écrire un jour l’histoire du spectacle ” [2], montrant par là que l’histoire n’était pas achevée pour lui. Riesel confond sans doute Debord avec Fukuyama, à moins que cela ne soit avec la veuve Debord, pour qui entre-temps une fétichisation du disparu est devenue une stratégie marchande solipsiste, parfaitement cynique. Mais l’ultime évolution du personnage Debord, même si elle avait correspondu à ce qu’en affirme Riesel, n’aurait évidemment pas constitué un jugement suffisant de la théorie situationniste : car, à affirmer cela sur un ton négatif, on ne ferait que reconduire sous une forme inversée l’identification de la théorie à sa personne que l’on reproche dans un même temps à Debord ; or, aucune théorie n’est simplement prouvée ou réfutée par la vie de son auteur — c’est celle-ci, au contraire, qui doit être jugée comme compatible ou non avec sa théorie. Ce qui seul prouve ou réfute une théorie — Debord l’avait bien exprimé — c’est l’usage que les mouvements radicaux futurs pourront en faire.
Il convient de rappeler à cet égard que l’EdN avait en son temps, dans son numéro 15, publié une critique du rôle historique joué par l’IS doublée d’un jugement passablement hypocrite sur Debord, qui cherchait à transformer un banal meurtre du père en duel à fleurets mouchetés, en comptant sur la complicité de l’adversaire (le père, endormi par les flatteries, était censé assister sans protester à son propre enterrement) : à l’époque, l’EdN prenait des gants que Riesel laisse à présent tomber, et rejetait les dernières publications de Debord tout en créditant son personnage du prestige de l’artiste-aventurier ayant réussi à titre personnel, alors que Riesel affirme maintenant que son “ esthétisation de sa vie ” ainsi que sa théorie du complot étaient venues se substituer à l’ancienne puissance théorique de Debord, devenue inutile dans un monde sans opposition. De cela, et des relations en général entre Debord et l’EdN, dont la Correspondance avec Guy Debord de Jean-François Martos avait donné de si instructifs aperçus, Riesel ne souffle pas un traître mot : ce qui ne plaide pas vraiment en faveur d’une parfaite honnêteté.
Ayant ainsi reprécisé des circonstances que Riesel feint d’ignorer et qu’il cache activement au lecteur, il nous reste à nous prononcer sur l’affirmation qu’avance implicitement Riesel : la critique des nuisances aurait dépassé la théorie situationniste, et permettrait à nouveau de se battre pratiquement, tandis que la théorie situationniste ne le permettait plus [3].
Il est d’abord historiquement faux d’opposer la critique des nuisances et la critique situationniste en général. La revue IS , dont la publication s’interrompt en 1969, n’a certes pas traité des nuisances, et avait éventuellement accumulé un certain retard ou une certaine myopie à cet égard (encore qu’à la même époque, la critique écologiste ne courait pas les rues, puisque les méfaits écologiques de l’industrie étaient encore de proportions limitées) ; mais le sujet est abordé dès 1972 dans La véritable scission dans l’Internationale [4], et on peut retenir sans aucune erreur possible que Semprun et son entourage s’étaient contentés, à partir de 1980 (date de parution de La Nucléarisation du monde) de reprendre dans la pensée de Debord cet aspect spécifique de la critique, pour d’ailleurs oublier complètement le reste, et pour s’en faire une spécialité, sans pourtant ajouter quoi que ce soit à la conceptualisation de la chose [5]. Le moins que l’on puisse dire, c’est donc qu’on ne peut être plus mal placé que l’EdN pour reprocher quoi que ce soit à la pensée de Debord, dont elle ne fut qu’un rejeton parcellaire.
La critique des nuisances n’a donc pas dépassé la critique debordienne dont elle représente au contraire une émanation tardive, et elle ne représente en rien un stade supérieur de la vieille critique prolétarienne ; mais, pour nécessaire qu’elle soit, elle représente plutôt, potentiellement, un danger pour celle-ci. En effet, et on le voit déjà pratiquement, la critique des nuisances facilite davantage la montée d’un dirigisme réformé (que Riesel appelle fort justement le “ parti des vaincus historiques ”) que celle d’une démocratie radicale — du moins si elle n’est pas resituée dans le cadre d’une critique plus globale (elle court donc exactement le même danger que celui qui s’était réalisé avec l’ancienne critique du libéralisme économique, débouchant sur la nationalisation et la gestion bureaucratique). Il est à cet égard significatif de constater à quel point ce sujet a réussi d’emblée à éclipser toute autre considération dans une revue comme l’EdN, exactement comme il l’avait fait dans les différentes officines écologistes [6]. L’EdN est à Debord, au mieux, ce que le marxisme fut à Marx, à ceci près que la production des nuisances y a remplacé la propriété privée des moyens de production.
Il est exact, comme le rappelle Riesel, que le rejet des nuisances fait davantage bouger le public, dans le monde actuel, que la critique du spectacle, tout comme le refus des licenciements et du chômage ont toujours davantage fait réagir leurs victimes que la critique du capital comme mode de production. On en comprend aisément les raisons, mais en quoi celles-ci peuvent-elles être interprétées au détriment de la critique la plus radicale et la plus englobante, qui est bien évidemment celle du spectacle et celle du capital ? Ne voit-on pas au premier coup d’œil le danger de telles limitations et de leur surestimation intéressée ? Toute l’expérience historique n’est-elle pas là pour le rappeler ? Le formidable talent du capitalisme pour la survie n’est-il pas entièrement fondé sur la réitération sempiternelle de telles confusions ? Cette prise de conscience, aussi vieille que les débuts du mouvement ouvrier, n’affleure même pas dans les propos de Riesel. Ses propos font comme si le refus des dernières performances du capital équivalait au refus du capital lui-même : alors que tout le monde sait à quel point de tels sous-entendus se couvrent promptement de ridicule. Et dans cette EdN orpheline de la tutelle debordienne et en cours d’adoption involontaire par Theodore Kaczynski et Teddy Goldsmith, la critique de la “ société industrielle ” est sur le point de remplacer celle du capital et de la marchandise.
2.   Le rôle historique du monde rural
Les propos de Riesel concernant le monde paysan ne laissent pas d’être éminemment contradictoires. Riesel se moque à juste titre des tentatives de rassurer le quidam “ avec le retour à de pseudo-traditions rurales, qui seraient un refuge possible de la qualité en matière agricole ”, mais il affirme néanmoins que dans ce milieu rural, il lui a été possible “ de réapprendre des pratiques qui constituent à bien des égards la véritable richesse humaine ”. Cette seconde sentence vient grandement limiter la portée de la première, car s’il faut rejeter l’affirmation médiatique du maintien du monde rural là où il a déjà disparu, il convient de rejeter également la nature même de ce monde rural tel qu’il existait encore. Dans les années soixante-dix, quand le régime de Mao exilait les intellectuels et les fonctionnaires en disgrâce dans des bagnes ruraux pour se purifier au contact du travail agricole, le drop-out occidental agissait de même en toute liberté, découvrant un, cent, mille Larzac, et la “ richesse humaine ” des Causses désertés ; il échappait ainsi à la dialectique historique issue du mouvement de 68, sans avoir à se confronter à ses prolongements inattendus. Le travail marginal fut ainsi l’idole d’un temps, et d’une génération de babas en fleurs, et d’ailleurs ne pouvait guère être autre chose. “ Il n’y a plus de paysannerie en France ”, constate à présent Riesel, mais comment le regretter ? Cette classe et ce milieu, que les individus épris d’émancipation fuyaient comme la peste depuis l’Antiquité grecque et à travers toute l’histoire occidentale, a scellé son propre destin en devenant, sans regret et sans guère d’hésitation, ces “ agriculteurs intégrés dans un segment de la production agro-industrielle ”, salariés occultes du Crédit Agricole, acceptant la perte totale de toute autonomie sous prétexte de devenir “ modernes ” [7] et d’oublier momentanément leur irréalité historique. Il ne s’agit pas d’accabler sous l’ironie une classe qui s’est trouvé exposée à des pressions d’une force irrésistible, et dont les vestiges survivent à présent dans des conditions de plus en plus misérables, déchiquetés par les différents requins de l’industrie agro-alimentaire : ces dernières faibles masses paysannes sont déjà suffisamment accablées pour qu’on leur fasse grâce d’en rajouter à leurs peines ; mais pour autant il semble indispensable de rappeler que la classe paysanne présentait tous les traits qui faisaient d’elle la dupe de la religion, de l’Etat, de la propriété privée, de la morale la plus étriquée, et de toutes les traditions susceptibles d’obscurcir l’esprit. A ce constat formulé et justifié depuis de nombreux siècles, Riesel oppose des considérations comme : “ on y trouvait des attitudes par rapport à la vie, et notamment à la vie sociale, très antinomiques avec le rationalisme dominant, un mode de vie, en tout cas, moins séparé que ce à quoi a abouti l’industrialisation en réduisant l’homme au travail et en colonisant ensuite le temps libre ”. Le caractère moins fragmenté du travail rural était déjà ce qui attirait le drop-out de l’après-68, et celui-ci s’extasiait de constater qu’on nourrissait des animaux, et qu’on soignait leurs maladies, avant que de les mener finalement à l’abattoir. Si en plus on récoltait soi-même le foin qu’on leur donnait ensuite à manger, et si l’on tannait les peaux qu’on avait prélevées sur leur dépouille, ne commençait-on pas à frôler le fameux “ homme total ” envisagé par le jeune Marx dans des circonstances pourtant quelque peu différentes ? Personne, en somme, ne voulait comprendre que le travail rural allait suivre l’évolution de tout travail, et que la déshumanisation achevée est tout simplement le destin mérité du travail aliéné, sur lequel il n’y a pas à revenir : car il est peut-être utile de rappeler, à titre de banalité de base, que le travail rural était et restait du travail ; que le paysan n’œuvrait pas pour son plaisir, mais pour gagner sa vie ; et que sa tâche, malgré des apparences archaïsantes, était aussi purement économique que celle du manœuvre chez Renault, ou de l’opérateur de saisie à l’Assedic. La dégradation qui s’en est ensuivie n’a rien démontré d’autre, et qui pourrait s’en étonner ?
Riesel se trouve donc constater d’une part que le monde paysan, qui reste par ailleurs incritiqué par lui, et considéré de façon non historique, n’existe plus, et, d’autre part, que “ sans civilisation paysanne, c’est la civilisation tout court qui se défait, on le constate aujourd’hui ”. Cette théorie critique d’un genre nouveau est donc celle d’un sujet historique défunt ; celle d’une cause d’ores et déjà irrémédiablement perdue ; celle de commentaires d’outre-tombe ; bref, une “ dialectique négative ” en regard de laquelle celle d’Adorno passerait pour une forme exubérante de positivisme. Heureusement que sa pratique ne se conforme pas à sa théorie, puisque Riesel fait partie de ceux qui ont agi contre l’industrie agro-alimentaire, et qui le feront sûrement encore, parmi les jacqueries bien méritées que la classe paysanne fomente avant de disparaître.
Le dépassement de l’opposition entre ville et campagne, dont l’industrie agro-alimentaire et la mercantilisation des produits, des méthodes de production et des lieux ruraux n’a pour l’heure construit que la plus sinistre caricature, devra davantage civiliser les campagnes qu’hériter de leur “ civilisation ”. Il n’y aura pas d’héritage.
3.   Le rôle historique de la rationalité scientifique et technocratique
«  L’enjeu de l’industrialisation de l’agriculture, qui atteint un stade ultime avec les chimères génétiques : il s’agit, ni plus ou moins, d’une tentative de supplanter définitivement la nature (extérieure et intérieure à l’homme), d’éliminer cette dernière résistance à la domination du rationalisme technologique. Une “raison” qui veut ignorer — et ici supprimer pratiquement — ce qui n’est pas elle, c’est, je crois, la définition minimum du délire. »  Ces constatations représentent effectivement le point de départ sine qua non de toute critique de la domination modernisée du capital, déjà exposé dans un ouvrage passablement ancien [8]. Mais en même temps que d’un délire, il s’agit d’une guerre sans merci, condamnée à se poursuivre jusqu’aux extrêmes, que la valeur d’échange livre à la valeur d’usage, d’une guerre “ qui couve au sein même de la forme marchande simple ”. “ La guerre marchande [...] est la forme absolue de la guerre, la recherche illimitée et immodérable de la destruction, l’indifférence aveugle à la survie de ses protagonistes et à un après-guerre qu’elle ne conçoit même pas [...] la guerre que la valeur d’échange et son pouvoir d’abstraction ont déclarée à la réalité tout entière est d’une autre espèce : car elle ne peut cesser que faute de combattants, aucune sorte de paix ne pouvant être conclue par la marchandise, qui raisonne comme venant d’un autre monde, et au mépris absolu du nôtre — lequel est pourtant son seul terrain d’action, pour notre plus grand malheur ” [9]. La gigantesque tunique de Nessus que le capital impose au réel lui brûle mortellement la peau, mais ce n’est pas, comme le pensent certains, une question de raison  ou de déraison : c’est une question d’asservissement de la raison — car il n’existe pas d’autre déraison que la raison asservie. La nature n’étant prise que comme un réservoir initial, et épuisable, de matière première, le capital a fait suivre à son appropriation formelle, fragile parce qu’aisée à contester, son appropriation réelle, c.a.d. la pénétration de la matière, le détournement de la programmation génétique, la confiscation de la capacité de reproduction du vivant.
La guerre de la valeur d’échange contre le réel a enrôlé dans son camp les capacités rationnelles et scientifiques. Ce ne sont donc nullement ces dernières qui sont en cause en leur principe, mais plutôt leur statut mercenaire, et la dégradation rationnelle que leur impose cet état de servilité. L’aveuglement de la science n’est pas consubstantiel d’elle, mais le rictus qui montre qu’elle a vendu son âme au diable, et qu’elle préfère devenir le contraire d’elle-même plutôt que de rompre son pacte avec le pouvoir et avec l’argent. Quand le système d’aliénation dominant “ déraisonne ” en termes de valeur d’usage, c’est simplement qu’il raisonne en termes de valeur d’échange.
Il faudra encore souvent revenir sur ce principe que l’IS avait établi, et que l’EdN avait sottement rejeté : l’affrontement sur le changement. Car dans la résistance à la frénésie de changement de la société capitaliste-marchande, on verra se multiplier les positions de repli sur un passé imaginaire, et il faudra s’opposer à elles comme aussi à l’ennemi principal.

Jean-François MARTOS Février 2001 


[1] René Riesel, “ Les progrès de la soumission vont à une vitesse effroyable ”, in : Libération du 4 février 2001.
[2] Commentaires sur la société du spectacle, thèse XXVII.
[3] A cet égard, il est utile d’éviter une confusion assez fâcheuse, qu’on trouve chez Riesel, entre la théorie situationniste (celle élaborée et exprimée par un groupe entre 1956 et 1969), et la théorie debordienne, qui s’est poursuivie jusqu'à la mort du personnage, en 1994.
[4] Le n° 15 de l’EdN s’en souvenait encore ; Riesel l’a maintenant oublié.
[5] Ce n’est que bien plus tard, après l’avoir longtemps refusé, qu’ils se sont mis à lire Adorno ou à citer Arendt, pour échapper à l’ahurissante étroitesse du corpus prositu. Il paraît même qu’ils seraient sur le point de découvrir Anders. Comme toutes les tentatives tardives de rattrapage, celles-ci servent hélas moins à enrichir la théorie critique qu’à la dévoyer, à la priver littéralement de son caractère critique. Le biorégionalisme professé dans les colonnes de The Ecologist, revue dans l’édition française de laquelle Riesel publie régulièrement, est cette idéologie passéiste qui venait tenir lieu de théorie critique pour des universitaires et chercheurs anglo-saxons qui n’avaient aucun lien, ni théorique ni pratique, avec l’histoire du mouvement de contestation sociale. Pour ces spécialistes de la nuisance, l’ennemi à abattre n’est pas la société capitaliste-marchande, qu’il faut d’abord penser, mais la société industrielle, qu’il suffit de regarder.
[6] Au point que Riesel et l’EdN sont très fiers de se distinguer de certains de leurs concurrents anti-OGM en ne s’en prenant pas qu’à la recherche et à la manipulation génétiques privées, mais aussi publiques ! Ils publient et affichent même des tracts pour souligner cette étonnante radicalité. Quelle audace, en effet. C’est comme si on osait critiquer l’éducation nationale, ou le CNRS, ou l’Assedic, ou, par exemple, un ministre ! Il faut donc sans crainte pressentir une véritable coupure dans l’histoire française contemporaine : le tabou du public pourrait être entamé, si l’EdN persiste et signe.
[7] On n’en est toujours qu’à 1% d’agriculture biologique en France.
[8] Tchernobyl, Anatomie d’un nuage, Editions Gérard Lebovici, 1987, p. 47 : “ L’entendement “scientifique” n’aime pas voir surgir en face de lui, faisant irruption par le réel, la raison des faits, la raison comme fait, dont il s’était efforcé de construire la méconnaissance établie, la dénégation savante ; cette raison qui lui apparaît comme un double, un impitoyable rival dont l’avance persistante le relègue, malgré ses remarquables progrès de savoir sectoriel, à l’état de superstition animiste devenue pratique ”.
[9] Ibidem, passim.

WHY ART CAN'T KILL THE SITUATIONIST INTERNATIONAL

"What does it matter to us what judgments may later be passed upon our obscure personalities? If we have seen fit to record the political differences that exist between the majority of the Commune and ourselves, this is not in order to apportion blame to the former and praise the latter. It is simply to ensure that, should the Commune be defeated, people will know that it was not what it has appeared to be up to now." - Gustave Lefrancais addressing constituents, 20 May 1871, cited in Internationale Situationniste nº12 (September 1969).               
No sooner were Guy Debord's ashes safely cast from the Pointe du Vert-Galant into the Seine, no sooner had death quelled his remorseless tendency to respond to everyone who made the least mention of him, than an emboldened pack of commentators bounded from their kennels, all desperately eager to position themselves, pro, con, or otherwise with respect to Debord's person, writings, and faits et gestes.
A case in point is the intrepid dabbler Régis Debray, sometime focal point of Guevarism, sometime advisor to President Mitterand. Debray, who by his own (wholly unreliable) account had never before engaged with Debord in any way, now felt an urgent need to denounce Debord's ideas, and specifically the concept of the spectacle, for their supposed idealism, for their young-Marxism and young-Hegelianism, for their unreconstructed Feuerbachianism - but most of all for their strict incompatibility with Debray's own positivist sociology of mass communications, which goes by the name of "mediology" (Régis Debray, "À propos du spectacle: Réponse à un jeune chercheur," Le Débat 85 (May-August 1995).
Sometimes modestly described as a small thing (Debray is prone to talking about "notre petite méthodologie"), this would-be new discipline has high ambitions. It pretends to the throne of semiology, no less - even though, to use Debray-speak, "Ôsemio" had a good half-decade's start on "Ômedio". But Debray also needs to keep his neo-empiricist baby away from the very slightest taint of totalizing or negative thought, and this is where Debord's global condemnation of the spectacle comes in handy: "For the Situationists . . . mediation is evil. For us, mediation is not only a necessity, it is civilization itself. For us man is man solely by virtue of technological mediation, and he needs the spectacle to gain access to his truth. It is via illusion that man discovers his reality [etc.] (Régis Debray, interview with Nicolas Weill, Le Monde, 19 July 1996.)
We were members of the Situationist International in 1966-67. This gives us no special vantage point with respect to the really interesting questions about the S.I. in its final, extraordinary years. In particular the key issue, of how and why the Situationist came to have a preponderant role in May 1968 - that is, how and why their brand of politics participated in, and to an extent fueled, a crisis of the late-capitalist State - is still wide open to interpretation. (And, for that matter, to simple factual inquiry. The scoffing and evasion and doctoring of the evidence about May 1968 shows no sign of letting up.) We shall get to some of these subjects in a moment. But we make no apology for starting from the bottom. Debray's maunderings are typical. And in a sense necessary. The efforts of organized knowledge to discredit the Situationists - to pin on them a final dismissive label and have them be part of "infantile Leftism" or "the politics of authenticity" or "the 1960s" or some such accredited pseudo-phenomenon - are at once entirely sensible (organized knowledge is at least good at identifying its real enemies) and wonderfully self-defeating. For some reason the SI will not go away.
All the same, one might well ask why we are responding to this particular piece of nonsense. Perhaps the Debray piece was irksome because it really did manage to plumb new depths, even in such a hotly contested field. Certainly we never expect to see it bettered for oily chat-show authoritativeness plus bare-faced amnesia about the writer's own part in the period and debates referred to; not to mention the more or less lunatic (but of course calculated) "esteem" that Debray ends by confessing for Debord "as an individual" - and as that rarity, "a professional moralist" who actually had "a personal moral code."
But there was something else, we realize, that got under our skin. It so happened that the British journal New Left Review chose to publish a (somewhat abbreviated) version of Debray's eulogy in its issue for November/December 1995 ("Remarks on the Spectacle," New Left Review, 214. [New Left Review hereinafter referred to NLR.])
The word "Left" recurs in what follows, and inevitably its meaning shifts. Much of the time it is used descriptively, and therefore pessimistically, to indicate a set of interlocking ideological directorships stretching roughly from the Statist and workerist fringes of Social Democracy and Labourism to the para-academic journals and think-tanks of latter-day Trotskyism, taking in the Stalinist and lightly post-Stalinist center along the way. But of course there would be no point in using this description if we did not think it still worth doing so in the name of, and hopefully for the benefit of, another Left altogether (we ask the indulgence of those, and there are many, who reject the term "Left" as irrevocably compromised). This is a Left whose struggles with the late-capitalist State are at present local and multiform ("identity" and "ecological" politics being merely those forms that the spectacle chooses for now to (mis)represent - and many others will surely be given the same cynical treatment in years to come); a Left, however, that increasingly senses the enormity of its enemy and begins to think the problem of contesting that enemy in terms not borrowed from Marxist-Leninism or its official Opposition; a Left whose insubordination is the theme of endless jeremiads from the "actually existing" Left, whose dismal battle cry - to unite and fight under the same old phony-communitarian banners - it persists in ignoring.
This was only the second time in the Review's history that it had addressed -- and misrepresented - the question of the Situationists (the first, of which there will be more in a moment, came in 1989, after a quarter-century of eloquent silence). (Cf. Peter Wollen, "The Situationist International," New Left Review, 174 [March/April 1989]. Versions of this article then appeared in An Endless Adventure. . .An Endless Passion . . . An Endless Banquet: A Situationist Scrapbook, ed. Iwona Blaswick [London and New York: ICA/Verso, 1989), and On the Passage of a Few People through a Rather Brief Moment in Time: The Situationist International 1957-1972, ed. Elizabeth Sussman [Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1989]. The publications accompanied a traveling exhibition designed to illustrate Wollen's thesis.) But contradictions will out, and as luck (or bad management) would have it, the Debray piece was placed in nice juxtaposition to lengthy and reverential discussions, in the same issue, of Eric Hobsbawm's "history of the short twentieth century" - his "report" as one wag put it, "to a Central Committee that just isn't there any more." The very idea of pressing too hard on Hobsbawm's omissions and excuses as a historian was denounced a priori by NLR as "anti-Communist". One law for young-Hegelians, it seems, and another for unrepentant Stalinists. To have been over-optimistic about the revolutionary potential of the Watts proletariat is one thing; to have spent one's life inventing reasons for forced collectivization, show trials, the Great Terror, the suppression of the East German and Hungarian uprisings, and so on ad nauseam, quite another. The former is the ranting of primitive rebels, the latter the hard analytic choices of Marxist history.
Naturally this steered our thoughts back to the NLR's earlier effort to invent a history of "Situationism" that would somehow avoid dealing with the moment, in the last years of the 1960s, when forms of Situationist-influenced politics actually confronted the journal's own so-called "mainstream" or "classical" Marxism. Mighty was the labor of the NLR's writer on art matters, Peter Wollen, when he was finally called in for the issue of March-April 1989; and many were the main currents and imaginative genealogies and thumbnail sketches of this important -ism and that: all in order to buttress the essential declaration, on the last page but one of his Shorter and Shorter Twentieth Century, that from 1962 onward in the work of the SI, "The denial by Debord and his supporters of any separation between artistic and political activity . . . led in effect not to a new unity within Situationist practice but to a total elimination of art except in propagandist and agitational forms. . . . Theory displaced art as the vanguard activity, and politics (for those who wished to retain absolutely clean hands) was postponed till the day when it would be placed on the agenda by the spontaneous revolt of those who executed rather than gave orders" (Wollen, "Situationist International"). Again the Michael Ignatieff authoritativeness is breath-taking. It so happens we remember Wollen in 1968, not yet having transferred his affections from Trotskyite center to avant-garde periphery, making the rounds of the main sites/sights of "student revolution" in Britain as a kind of New Left observer, and recoiling in horror from the ideological impurities he discovered there - of course reserving his full Jonathan Edwards for "those damned Situationists, the lowest of the low!" That remark we recall specifically (we wore such verdicts as a badge of honor).
Far be it from us to suggest that this makes Wollen an unreliable guide to the scene after twenty years' reflection. Age brings wisdom, even repentance. But it means he has - how shall we say? - an interesting perspective on the events he has chosen to narrate.
Enough, enough. In the end the interest in the Debray/NLR proceedings lies in the way they reveal, just a little more flagrantly than usual, the structure (and function) of what now passes for knowledge of the SI from 1960 on. The established wisdom, let us call it. It can be broken down into four essential propositions, though obviously these overlap and repeat themselves.
Proposition 1: The Situationist International was an art organization (a typical late-modernist avant-garde that strayed belatedly into "art politics." Judged as art, its politics do not amount to much. And surely they are not meant to be judged as politics!
Proposition 2: The SI in its last ten years was an art-political sect, consumed with the lineaments of its own purity, living on a diet of exclusions and denunciations, and largely ignoring the wider political realm, or the problems of organization and expansion that presented themselves in an apparently prerevolutionary situation. Call this the clean-hands thesis. Or the burning-with-the-pure-flame-of-negativity thesis. (Proposition 2 is subscribed to, be it said, by many of the SI's admirers.)
Proposition 3: Situationist politics was "subjectivist," post- or hyper-Surrealist, propelled by a utopian notion of new "politics of everyday life" that can be reduced to a handful of Ô68 graffiti: "Take your desires for reality," "Boredom is always counter-revolutionary," etc.
Proposition 4: Situationist theory, especially as represented by Debord's The Society of the Spectacle, is hopelessly young-Hegelian - rhetorical, totalizing, resting on a metaphysical hostility to "mere" appearance or representation, and mounting a last-ditch defense of the notion of authenticity, whether of individual or class subject.
Like all good travesties, these four propositions are not simply lies. All of them point to real problems in the work of the Situationists after 1960, and the last thing we want to do is to suggest those problems did not exist. What we do think, however, is that each of the propositions is a flimsy half-truth, never properly argued by Left opinion-makers, and contradicted by a body of evidence with which these opinion-makers are intimately acquainted but which they choose not to mention. The reason is not far to seek. Each proposition has a barely hidden corollary, and it is the truth of the corollary that this Left wants (and needs) to affirm.
Corollary 1: Therefore, the bone-hard philistinism of the Left in the 1960s and after - the fact that it called the likes of Peter Fuller, Tel Quel, Roger Garaudy, John Berger, Ernest Fischer, etc., as guides to the new regimes of representation then being ushered in - did not and does not matter. [The reader is invited to supply other names. We had a hard job thinking of any.]
Corollary 2: Therefore, the failure of the established Left to pose the problems of revolutionary organization again, and come to terms with the disaster of its Leninist and Trotskyite past, likewise does not matter. Such things are distractions. Dirty hands make light work. And the Left's love affairs with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, or the foci of Che Guevera and the Ecole Normale Superiere, or the Burmese road to socialism, or the Italian Communist Party, or Tony Benn and Tom Hayden - or a hundred other objects that left the Situationists cold for reasons stated by them in detail at the time - are now so much water under the bridge. Jedermann sein eigner Fussball [every man his own football], apparently. The Left may have prostrated itself in front of Mao's starving and stage-managed utopia. But at least it was not fooled by black uprisings in the United States. So many misled, premature lumpens, lacking (the Left's) direction, unaware that the time was not ripe for insurrection (for these guys it never is or will be). "Spontaneity"! The very word brings on a shudder or a giggle.
Corollary 3: Therefore, the grounds of Left theory and practice need not shift. The regime of policy-studies-plus-theory-refereeing needs no renewal to speak of. Raising the problem of the social construction of "subjects" in late capitalism, and possible forms of resistance to such construction, and above all exploring the implications of the invasion and restructuring of whole realms of representation that had once been left largely outside the commodity regime -- the set of issues the Situationists broached under the rubric "the colonialization of everyday life" - all of this leads in the wrong direction. It leads to "identity politics," which every good 1960s survivor is supposed to blame for the demise of the Left.
Corollary 4: Therefore, the Left's infatuation with the wildest and most dubious forms of anti-Hegelianism, semiotic Maoism, PCF paranoid not-the-subject-but-the-Party-ism, uninhabited universes made up of apparatuses, instances, structures, subcultural tics, and systemes de la mode, weightless skepticisms and eternal battlings with the ghastly specters of "empiricism" and "scientism" is entirely valid, and has nothing to do with the Left's being listened to these days, on matters of theory, by no one who is not a subscriber to Representations or Diacritics or Modern Language Notes.
You will notice that the hidden corollaries have a lot more substance than the original arguments about the SI. And that is appropriate. The arguments are ridiculously thin. It is the corollaries that count. It would be tedious, then, to go point by point through the cheery misrepresentations and present the evidence for their untruth. Better to take one or two topics at random, and convey the general flavor.
Who would ever have thought, for a start, that the SI as pictured by the established wisdom had time, in the intervals between exclusions and anathemata, for analyses of political events in the world outside? For example, the series of interventions in the evolving situation in Algeria, at the time of Ben Bella and Boumedienne, culminating in the long article "Les Luttes de classes en Algerie" (published in the Situationist journal for March 1966, and then as a wall poster). Or the pamphlet of August 1967 on Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, "Le Point d'Explosion de l'ideologie en Chine" (reprinted in the journal later that year). We are obviously biased judges, but we persist in thinking that these texts are classics of Marxist analysis. (In both cases the SI benefited from having members who possessed real knowledge of the language and history of the countries concerned, as opposed to forming opinions from books by fellow-travelers and editorials in Le Monde.) We wonder if those who now dismiss the "political" SI could come up with commentaries on the same or comparable subjects from the same period that strike them, in retrospect, as even roughly as good. Good meaning disabused and passionate.
Then there is the question of Debord's The Society of the Spectacle. Again, a few topics at random. The book was published in November 1967. It was written, that is, at the same time as the political analyses we have just mentioned (along with various others published in the SI journal or as pamphlets: on Watts and the commodity economy, on the Six Day War and the Middle East, on the first peculiar stirrings of "youth revolt," and so on), and it was clearly meant to be read alongside those analyses. [Most of these texts can be found in English translation in Ken Knabb's Situationist International Anthology (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981).] It is very much more a "political" book than you would ever dream from reading most accounts of it by detractors or enthusiasts. How would anyone suspect, from Debray's account and many others like it, that by far the book's longest chapter is entitled "The Proletariat as Subject and Representation," and that this hinge of the overall argument turns (once again) on the question of Leninism, the Party, and the history of the working-class movement? Of course our question is faux naif. This aspect of The Society of the Spectacle Must not be talked about. Either because it would pull commentators back from the dreamworld of simulacra they wish to believe Debord inhabited or predicted, or because arguing with it would involve remembering one's own "positions," then and now.
Let us concede one or two points. Of course The Society of the Spectacle was conceived as a work of "high theory," and depends on a dialogue with texts, mostly drawn from the deep past of Marxism, German philosophy, and French classical literature, which it finds a way to ventriloquize and exacerbate. (Debray's suggestion that the book "admits to plagiarism only in extremis" - in a single thesis toward the end - is pure bad faith. Quite apart from the fact that Debray knows perfectly well, as everyone does, that at the moment Debord is quoting Lautremont on plagiarism, The Society of the Spectacle voices its dependence on the past in every paragraph. That dependence is far deeper and weirder than a speed-reader like Debray has time to bother with.) The question to ask is what might have been the strategic point of such a way of writing in 1967. Dates matter. Althusser's For Marx and Reading "Capital" were two years old, and sweeping the Left in Europe. When Debray says airily that "we were all Feuerbachians in our youth, all great enthusiasts for the young Marx," the little confession conjures away what "we" all became a few years later. [Not that the "we" became just one thing. Debray's own sinuous trajectory is not our concern here; the curious (if they exist) may trace it through his voluminous autobiographical writings, or take a look at his Media Manifestoes, recently published in English translation (London and New York: Verso, 1996). But a shared need to avoid the hard core of Debord makes strange bed-fellows. Thus Philippe Soller's recent discovery that Debord's work is "one of the greatest of the century," that Debord is "un classique parmi les classiques," etc. (see, for example, Libération, December 6, 1994, p. 34), is ridiculed by Debray as so much "brandishing of the mystical corpse" and "psalmodizing of pale detournements into dazzling inventions" (Le Débat, art. cit., p. 6). What all this dueling hyperbole papers over is that both Debray and Sollers, the one disparagingly, the other admiringly, want above all to imprison Debord's negativity in an ivory tower. As an antidote to Debray and Sollers, see Anselm Jappe, Guy Debord (Pescara: Edizioni Tracce, 1993); French (and revised) edition, translated by Claude Galli: Guy Debord (Marseille: Via Valeriana, 1995) - a straightforward, honest and non-hagiographical study.]
What Debray produced in 1967, the year the Debord book appeared, was Revolution in the Revolution, which does for Fidel Castro what Sidney and Beatrice Webb did for Stalin. Fashions in cybernetics and hard-line structuralism had then just promoted (or given new prominence to) the discipline of semiotics. This was the moment, in other words, when the very word "totality," ands the very idea of trying to articulate those forces and relations of production which were giving capitalism a newly unified and unifying form, were tabooed (as they largely still are) as remnants of a discredited "Hegelian" tradition.
[No one is pretending that the effort at totalization in Debord is risk-free; still less that his example should point us back to some ludicrous Hegel revival. But it is time to retire the claim that "the pursuit of totality" necessarily equals "undifferentiation," "Organic unity," "refusal of specificity and autonomy," etc. A good first step would be to reread the analytic sections of The Philosophy of Right, and then contrast Hegel's account of the constitution (and contradictions) of social identities with, say, those little myths of absence and difference -- generalized from a pseudo-psychology to any and every scale and social circumstance -- which are all the Left currently has to offer an "identity politics" in search of a theory and practice.]
These things were on Debord's mind. One of us remembers him at the Collège de France in 1966, sitting in on Hippolite's course on Hegel's Logic, and having to endure a final session at which the master invited two young Turks to give papers. "Trois étapes de la dégénérècence de la culture bourgeoise française" said Debord as the last speaker sat down. "Premièrement, l'érudition classique" - he had in mind Hippolite himself, who had spoken briefly at the start of things - "quand même basée sur une certaine connaissance générale. Ensuite le petit con stalinien, avec ses mots de passe: "Ô Travail, Ô Force et Ô Terreur". Et enfin - dernière bassesse - le sémiologue." In other words, The Society of the Spectacle was conceived and written specifically as a book for bad times. It was intended to keep the habit of totalization alive -- but of course to express, in every detail of its verbal texture and overall structure, what a labor of rediscovery and revoicing (indeed, of restating the obvious) that project would now involve.
The obvious it has to be, then once again - since there is such a determination not to face it. For the Situationists, the overwhelming reality was Stalinism, the damage and horror it had given rise to, and its capacity to reproduce itself, in ever newer and technically more plausible forms, within a Left that had never faced its own complicity or infection. (We shall never begin to understand Debord's hostility to the concept "représentation," for instance, unless we realize that for him the word always carried a Leninist aftertaste. The spectacle is repugnant because it threatens to generalize, as it were, the Party's claim to be the representative of the working class.) The Society of the Spectacle's forced conversation with the early Marx, and with the shades of Feuerbach and Hegel, is an answer to this situation. "Forced" in two senses: it is ostentatious and obviously pushed to excess (so that even Debray cannot miss it); and these qualities are precisely the signs of the tactic being a tactic, forced on the writer by the history - the disaster - he is recounting.
We are not saying that the book does not suffer from the strategy it thinks it has to adopt. Of course it does. But we are saying that the strategy made possible a kind of sanity - inseparable from the book's overweening hubris, its determination to think world-historically in the teeth of specialists from Left and Right - which could be purchased no other way. And we are saying that to choose not to recognize what other modes of Left discourse The Society of the Spectacle was launched against is to continue the very habits of amnesia and duplicity that the book had full in its sights.
Lastly, and perhaps centrally, a word on the question of organization. That the SI in the 1960s was a small group is true. That its policy of aiming for constant agreement on key matters, and fighting against the reproduction of hierarchy and ideological freezing within the group, led to repeated splits and exclusions, ditto. We parted company with the Situationists in 1967 on just these questions, as applied to the SI's actions in Britain and the US. We are not likely, therefore, to think the Situationists always got these things right. All the same, what we find nauseating in the received account is the implication that concern for problems of internal organization - above all a determination to find a way out of the legacy of "democratic centralism" - is more token of these art-politicians' lack of seriousness. Anyone who actually reads what the SI wrote in 1966 and 1967 will quickly realize that it could not have issued from a group of people walled into their own factional struggles. There were such struggles. They were thought (sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly, in our view) to be the necessary condition of the kind of revolutionary clarity that informs the best of Situationist writing. But the Situationists never got stuck in their own turmoil, and they went on thinking, especially as things heated up in the course of 1967, about how they were to act - to "expand" - if the capitalist State offered them an opportunity. Here, for instance, are extracts from a working document entitled "Réponse aux camarades de Rennes - sur l'organization et l'autonomie." Signed by Debord, Khayati, and Viénet, and dated 16 July 1967, this text came out of a series of discussions (and joint actions) with other small groups on the Left.
The discussion begun on 3 July between us and the comrades of two groups affiliated with the Internationale Anarchiste seems to us to have revealed the existence - alongside our agreement on the essential, and indeed as the outcome of that very agreement - of divergent views on the question of organization. These divergences may be summed up as follows: whereas we are definitely in favor of a proliferation of autonomous revolutionary organizations, Loic Le Reste [of the Rennes group] thinks far more in terms of a fusion of such groups. This is not to say, of course, that Le Reste ultimately favors a single revolutionary movement as a whole; nor do we for our part have some kind of formal attachment to artificial distinctions between groups that rightly recognize their own fundamental unity on the main theoretical and practical issues.
The question does not therefore turn on some abstract definition of an absolute organizational model, but rather on a critical examination of present conditions, and on particular choices regarding the prospects for real action.
It is well known that the SI has never "recruited" members, though it is always willing to welcome individuals on an ad hoc basis; and both aspects of this policy have been determined by the concrete conditions which in our view have circumscribed our practical activity - that activity conceived as means and ends, inseparably - and thus the issue does not depend merely on an individuals' capacity to understand, or willingness to espouse, particular theoretical positions. (As for the theoretical positions themselves, we naturally hope that all who are able, in the full sense of the term, to appropriate them, will make free use of what they appropriate.) Very schematically, we may say that the SI considers that what it can do at present is work, on an international level, for the reappearance of certain basic elements of a modern-day revolutionary critique. The activity of the SI is a moment which we do not mistake for a goal: the workers must organize themselves, they will achieve emancipation through their own efforts, etc. We cannot accept the idea that numerical "reinforcement" is a virtue per se. It can be harmful from an internal point of view, if it produces an imbalance between what we really have to do and a membership which can serve those ends only in an abstract way, and which is thus subordinate, whether for geographical or other reasons. It can be harmful from an external point of view, to the extent that it presents another example of the Will to Pseudo-Power, after the fashion of those many Trotskyist groups possessed of a "ruling party vocation."
Even more strongly, we disagree with Loic Le Reste when he argues that the autonomy of different organizations can introduce a hierarchy among them. On the contrary, we think that hierarchy threatens to appear within an organization as soon as some of its members can be constrained to approve and execute what the organization decides, while possessing less power than other members to affect the decision. But we do not see how an effectively autonomous organization - and of course one that has rejected any notion of double allegiance - could become subordinate to an outside power. L'Unique et sa propriété [a pamphlet published in 1967 by a group of recent SI excludees known as the "Garnautins"] charges that "Whenever the SI affects to debate theoretical issues with various other revolutionary organizations ... things always degenerate into bureaucratic farce, in which judgment is passed on these movements and their programs from the lofty and abstract point of view of a disembodied radicalism." But it is only if the kind of relationship in question was really bureaucratic - that is, aiming at subordination - or if our root-and-branch radicalism was indeed abstract and disembodied (which remains to be proven ... that one could legitimately talk of the SI seeking a superior role - in the first case practically, in the second as empty wish-fulfillment. Anyway, what kind of revolutionary organization, composed of what kind of idiots, would actually let itself be subordinated in such a way?
As for the possibility of fusions in the future, we believe that they will best take place at revolutionary moments, when the workers' movement is further advanced.
We do not claim to have a secret formula that will solve the organizational problem of the period ahead. In any case, this question can be neither raised nor resolved entirely within the context of today's small radical groups. We (and some others) are sure of only a few basic principles: for instance, the necessity of not following old models, without, however, falling back into the pseudo-innocence of purely informal relationships. These principles are our starting point; and without question one of them is respect for the autonomy of the many groups that are worth talking to, and a determination to go on talking to them in good faith.
We cite the "Réponse aux camarades de Rennes" because its contents contradict the current travesty-history of the SI during this period, and not least that travesty-history's favorite political claim - that the Situationists were simply "council communists" whose only answer to the practical questions of revolutionary politics was to hypostatize past experiments with workers' councils as a way of solving all problems of organization in advance. Again, this charge is not simply empty. The invocation of Kiel and Barcelona could be, at times, a kind of mantra. But in practice the invocation coexisted with a whole range of actions and negotiations that aimed to throw the issue of organization back into the melting pot. And consider the invocation itself! Of course any revolutionary practice has to learn from the past, and no doubt idealize that past in doing so. But better an idealized image of 1918 and 1936 than of the years, and kinds of power, that most of the Left put on a pedestal.
We realize that by concentrating on the issues we have selected from the Situationists' final years we run the danger of seeming to fall in with the established notion of some sort of epistemological (and practical) break in the SI's history, taking place in the early 1960s, by which "art" gave way to "politics." It is a crude model, shedding about as much useful light on the difference between "early" and "late" Situationists as Althusser's does on "early" and "late" Marx. All of the activity we have mentioned was conceived as an aspect of a practice in which "art" - meaning those possibilities of representational and antirepresentational action thrown up by fifty years of modernist experiment at the borders of the category - might now be realized. This was the truly utopian dimension of SI activity. And it could and did become a horizon of possibility that meant too little in practice. But only at moments. Surely the remarkable thing, which it now takes a massive effort of historical imagination to recapture, is how active - how instrumental - this utopian dimension was in what the Situationists actually did. It was the "art" dimension, to put it crudely - the continued pressure put on the question of representational forms in politics and everyday life, and the refusal to foreclose on the issue of representation versus agency - that made their politics the deadly weapon it was for a while. And gave them the role they had in May 1968. This is the aspect of the 1960s that the official Left wants most of all to forget.
Inevitably, we have focused here on the SI and the Left. It was the Left (as opposed to, say, the art world) that the Situationists most hated in the 1960s and thought worth targeting. Whether the Left is still worth targeting we are not sure. We have tried several times to write a conclusion to these pages that did so, and have come up hard against the emptiness of the present. As usual, Debord is the best guide to this state of affairs. "Long ago," he says in his 1992 preface to The Society of the Spectacle, re-published in Paris by Gallimard and translated into English as "Preface to the Third French Edition" in The Society of the Spectacle (New York: Zone Books, 1994),
Thesis 58 had established as axiomatic that "The spectacle has its roots in the fertile field of the economy, and it is the produce of this field which must in the end come to dominate the spectacular market."
This striving of the spectacle toward modernization and unification, together with all the other tendencies toward the simplification of society, was what in 1989 led the Russian bureaucracy suddenly, and as one man, to convert the current ideology of democracy - in other words, to the dictatorial freedom of the Market, as tempered by the recognition of the rights of Homo Spectator. No one in the West felt the need to spend more than a single day considering the import and impact of this extraordinary media event - proof enough, were proof called for, of the progress made by the techniques of the spectacle. All that needed recording was the fact that a sort of geological tremor had apparently taken place. The phenomenon was duly noted, dated, and deemed sufficiently well understood; a very simple sign, "the fall of the Berlin Wall", repeated over and over again, immediately attained the incontestability of all the other signs of democracy.
The "very simple sign" still rules. It does so for all kinds of reasons, including the utter failure of the Left to face what the sign might mean for it - what it might say about its fifty-year collaboration with Stalinist counterrevolution, and the kinds of theoretical and practical monsters such collaboration bred. The sign still rules. Therefore no move to the apodictic or universal rings true, and yet we gag at the current rhetoric of detotalization: as Wollen writes in his "Situationist International" article, "We move from place to place and from time to time," etc. Sooner or later the history of the SI is bound to serve in the construction of a new project of resistance. The sooner the better; there is no reason to think the moment will be long coming. What that project will be like is still guesswork. Certainly it will have to struggle to reconceive the tentacular unity of its enemy and articulate the grounds of a unity capable of contesting it. The word "totality" will not put [the project] at panic stations. It will want to know the past. And inevitably it will find itself retelling the stories of those moments of refusal and reorganization -- the SI being only one of them -- that the dreamwork of the Left at present excludes from consciousness.
Timothy J. Clark and Donald Nicholson-Smith October 1979, Winter 1997


Timothy  j. CLARK,, exclu de l' IS le 21 décembre 1967 (voir lettre du 21 décembre 1967 dans la correspondance de Debord - Tome 3 - publiée chez Fayard), il s' enferme dans une tour d' ivoire académique et se lance à la recherche des racines historiques de la société du spectacle. A publié avec Donald Nicholson-Smith un texte intéressant sur l' héritage du situationnisme: Why art can't kill the Situationist International. A écrit la préface du livre d' Anselm Jappe sur Debord.
Une bibliographie:
- The absolute bourgeois: artists and politics in France 1848-1851. Thames and Hudson, London, 1988, 0-500-27246-8
- Farewell to an idea: episodes from a history of Modernism, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, 0-300-07532-4
- Image of the people, Gustave Courbet and the 1848 revolution, University of California Press, 1999, 0-52021745-4
- Jackson Pollock: Abstraktion und Figuration. 1. Aufl. Hamburg, Edition Nautilus, 1994, ISBN: 3-89401-234-X
- The painting of modern life: Paris in the art of Manet and his followers, Thames and Hudson, London, 1996, 0-500-27575-0
- Theory of inspiration: composition as a crisis of subjectivity in romantic and post-romantic writing, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1997, 0-71905064-2  


NICHOLSON-SMITH, Donald, exclu de l' IS le 21 décembre 1967 (voir lettre du 21 décembre 1967 dans la correspondance de Debord - Tome 3 - publiée chez Fayard), il traduit en anglais le "Traité de savoir-vivre" de Vaneigem ainsi que "La société du spectacle" de Debord (Debord a donné son imprimatur à cette traduction), ce qui lui vaut peut-être d' apparaître très brièvement dans le film "In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni" de ce dernier. Est le traducreur omniprésent des textes situs en anglais. A publié avec Timothy Clark un texte intéressant sur l' héritage du situationnisme: Why art can't kill the Situationist International

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